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MCDONALD V. CHICAGO AD '.

W. R. R. CO.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
McDONALD ET UX v. THE CHICAGO & N. W. R. RL CO
The allowance of an amendment to a petition, increasing the amount of damages claimed, was held not erroneous.
There exists acommon law duty on the part of railway companies to provide
reasonable accommodations at their stations, for passengers who are invited
and expected to travel on their roads.
If the station room is full, or if it is intolerably offensive by reason of tobacco
smoke, so that a passenger has good reasons for not remaining there, it will
Justify his endeavor to enter the cars at as early a periodas possible, and if in.
so doing he receives an injury from the unsafe and dangerous condition of the
platform or steps, in a place wherepassengers wouldnaturallygo, the company
are liable therefor, if the passenger used proper care, and violated no rule or
regulation of the company of which be bad actual knowledge, or which, as a
resonable man, he would be bound to presume existed.
In an action for damages, by a husband and wife against a railroad company,
for permanent injuries received by the wife, the Carlisle tablet may be admitted to show the expectancy of the wife's life, when it appears from the evidence
that, by reason of such injuries, a servant had been, and probably would have
to be, employed to do the work the wife had been accustomed to do.
Section 2771n,
of the Revision, changes the common law rule, that, in an action
wherein thehusband and wife were joined, for an injuryto the wife, the recovery
was iimited to damages for that injury alone, and did not embrace the injury
to the husband; and under said section the husband, in such an action, may
join thereto a claim in his own right, and recover for the loss of searvices of the
wife, occasioned by the injury.
An attorney, who by an agreement with his client, is to receive a portion of
whatever amount shall be recovered, is not a necessary party plantin
and
need not be joined as such.
Ratiroad companies are held to a strict accountability for the safety of passen
gers. To enable them to properly discharge this duty, they have power to
make reasonable rules and regulations respecting the time, mode and place of
enteringthecars; and these, when known to the pauenger,heis boundto conform
to, and he cannot violate them by pursuing another course and hold the company liable for damages thus occasioned, though the jury may believe that an
ordinarily prudent man might have adopted the same course.
In the present case, which was an action by a husband and wife against a
railway company, as common carriers, to recover damages for injuries to the
wife, caused by defective steps to a platform to which the train bad backed,
and which was not the usual place for passengers to get on and off the cars, the
Jary should have been instructed to ascertain from the evidence whether the
company had designated or set apart the platform In front of the depot as the
place where it required all passengers to enter the cars: if so, and this was
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known to the plaintiffs, and they, t disregard of such requirement, in advance
of time, and without any justlflcation, sought to enter tke ears at another
place, and, in so doing, met with the injury, thae the company would not be
liable as common carriers.
But K on the other hand, there wa5 no such rule or regulation known to the
p1aitlf, and they in good faith, and using reasonable care were seeking to
Sad and enter the cars. the compa.ay would be liable, as the plaintifra would
have a right to presume that the platform and its approaches were in a safe
condition. The authorities sustaining the foregoing principles collated at

DzLzxox, CK. 1.
As a general pile, railroad companies are bound to keep in a safe condition
all portions of their platforms and approaches thereto, to which the public do
or would naturally reuoit sad all portions of their station grounds reasonably
near to the platforms, where passengers or those who have purchased tickett
with a view to take pasage on their cars, would naturally or ordinarily be
likely to go.

APPEAL FROM TANN DISTRICT COURT.
This was an action to recover damages for an injury reoived by Mrs. McDonald.

The petition avers that the defendants are common carriers
of passengers; that, on the 3d day of January, 1867, at defendant's station, in Cedar Rapids, Mrs. Mc.]). (plaintiff) purchased
a ticket entitling her to be carried from Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
to Fulton, Ill., and, that, "1thereupon it became and was the
duty of the defendant to use due and proper care that the plaintiffshould*be safely placed in said train, and so to construct and
keep in good repair the platform around the said depot and the
steps to the same, that plaintiff could safely go from the platform to the cars;" yet the defendant neglected its duty in
this behalf; "so that the plaintiff; in going from the platform
to the cars, fell through a step connected therewith, which
defendant had negligently left in an unsafe condition, by reason of which fall she broke her ankle bone and was other.
wise injured," etc. Answer:
1. In denial.,
2. That the injury was caused by the plaintiff's own negligence.
3. That, before suit brought, "plaintiffs sold and conveyed
t one'E. Latham, one half of the claim in suit, who still owns
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the said Ealf-of said claim, so that the plaintiffs were not then,
and are not now, the sole real parties in interest in the action."
On the trial it appeared i4 evidence that the plaintiffs pro.
cured tickets of the defendant, at its station in Cedar Rapids,
and waited in the passenger room at the station until the arrival of the train in which they expected to take passage. The
trainafrived at 6.20 P. M., and left at 6.45 P. M. When the
train arrived, the plaintiffs went to take their seats in the cars,
aid when about to step upon the train heard the announcement
of "twenty minutes for supper." Mr. McDonald testified that;
about the time this announcement was made, "the train started
and moved back beyond the platform, and I told my wife we
had better go back into the room till such a time as the train
should come forward. She said 'no,' she would rather sit
down on the platform, or stand up there, as the room was so
full of tobacco smoke that she could not stand it. It made her
sick. I proposed to her that we should go back to the cars
and get on, as it was cold. We startedand walked ontheplatform toward the cars until we came to the west end of the platform, and in going down the steps, one of them being loose and
out of place at one end, it gave way and came up between my
legs, and threw us both on the track head foremost, down
under the train."
The evidence showed that the accident happened when it
was "dusk, or getting dark."" There was evidence .tending to
show care in descending the steps where the accident happened.
Mrs. McDonald was 59 years old, and weighed about 200
pounds. There was evidence showing that the passenger depot,
if not full, was crowded with foreign emigrants who wer,
smoking. The plaintiff, Mr. McDonald, testified, "that it was
thick with tobacco smoke, so much so that it was difficult for
one to breathe, and my wife took more offense at it .than I
did." Mrs. McDonald testified: "that it was so smcky that
it made me sick," and that this was the reason why she did
not go back into the room, but went west along the platform
to. get aboard of the cars.
This testimony as to the smoky condition of the room was
allowed to go to the jury against the defendant's objection..
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TIhe lefendant produced evidenoe that the steps where
kaintift fell were about 300 feet distant from the door of the
passenger depot; and that the usual place for passengers to get
on and'off of the cars was in front of the passenger depot, and
the platform between it and the freight depot.
Passengers to and from the Dubuque and S. W. R. R. depot
usually pass over these steps.
It was also shown by the defendant that it was customary
when the train arrived, as in.this instance, from the west, to
run back so as to bring the baggage and express cars to a point
opposite the freight depot, for the purpose of discharging and
receiving baggage and express matter. This movement, on
the evening on which the accident in question happened, placed
the passenger coaches west of the west end of the platform, so
that the nearest passenger car was about one car length beyond
thp steps at the west end of the platform.
It was while the cars were thus standing, that the plaintiffs,
without waiting for them to be drawn-up to the platform in
front of the passenger .depot, started for them, walking the
whole length of the platform, and in descending the steps the
injury for which this action is brought happened.
. Defendant also produced evidence to the effect, " that there
was plenty of room to get on and off the trains front the plat.
form; and there was no necessity for any one to go down
these steps to get on. Before leaving, train always draws up
in front of the passenger depot, and stops to take on passengers. The accident happened fifteen or twenty minutes before the leaving time of the train. The steps are not intended
or used for passengers to get on the trains.
The defendant asked the court to give the following in.
structions, viz.:
"1. If the jury believe from. the evidence, that the defeudant, at the time of the alleged injury at the station at Cedar
Rapids, was provided with a safe and suitable platform in front
"qf and adjacent to the passenger-rooms of said station, so
that passengers could safely and conveniently pass from said
rooms to the trains, and that passenger trains stopped at said platform for the purpose of receivingpassengers, and ifsaid plaintifik
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in attempting to get upon said train by a different and unusual
way and at a different and unusual place, met vith said acci6
dent, then the plaintiffs are not entitled to recoverin this action.
"2. That if the plaintiff, Margaret McDonald, attempted to
enter said train at a place not prepared or designed by the
defendant for receiving passengers on trains, there being no
paramount necessity for so doing, and in making such attempt
she received the said injury, then her own fault contributed
to the same, and the plaintiffs cannot recover.
"3. The liability of the defendant as a common carrier did
not commence as to the plaintiffs until the train which they
were to take was drawn up to the usual place for receiving
passengers, unless they were directed bysome authorized agent
of defendant to go upon the train at another and different place,
or before the train reached the usual place.
"4. If the jury believe from the evidence, that, before the
commencement of this action, the plaintiffs agreed with Mr. E.
Latham, that, as the consideration for his services in this action
he was to have one-half of all the money collected in said action, then the plaintiffs cannot recover in this action."
Each of these was refused, and the defendant excepted.
The court, after referring to the issues made by the plead.
ings, charged the jury as follows:
"3. If you find from the evidence that E. Latham, the
plaintiffs' attorney, agreed to prosecute plaintiffs' claim for onehalf he may recover, that does not make such an assignment
as to make it necessary that he should be a party plaintiff.
"4. The principal question for you to determine is, by
whose fault or negligence did the accident occur? If one of the
steps was.loose and not nailed down, by reason of which the accident happened, it is s tch a want of care as would render the
defendant liable, unless you find that the accident happened,
or was contributed to, by the want of ordinary care and prudence on the part of the plaintiff, Margaret McDonald.
"5. It is for you to determine from the evidence whether
the plaintiff, Margaret McDonald, used ordinary care and prudence in leaving the depot and going to the cars by the way
and at the time she did, and by ordinary care is meant such
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care and prudence as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under like circumstances.
"6. If you find that an ordinarily prudent person would
not have gone down the steps of the platform where the accident occurled, but would have waited until the passenger
cars were opposite the passenger depot, then the defendant ie
not liable. And if you find that the plaintiffs went by a way
which was not used or traveled over by passengers to enter the
cars, and that a person of ordinary prudence would not have
gone by that way, you may fairly infer that there was a want
of ordinary care on her part. Passengers must exercise ordinary care in approaching and entering the cars.
"7. If,however, you find that the defendant backed itr
train up to the place where it stood when the accident happened; that persons could conveniently and safely approach
tie train where it then stood but for the defective step, and
there was no rule or regulation of the company prohibiting
persons from approaching the cars by that way, and that an ordinarily prudent person would have approached the train by
that way, the defendant is liable if the accident occurred by
reason of the defective step."
* The defendant excepted tp this charge.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs for $2,000. A
motion for a new trial was overruled, and judgment was entered against the defendant, from which it prosecutes the present appeal.
E. S. Bailey for the appellant.
ER.Latham for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DimLoN, C. J.Appellant's various grounds for a reversal
of the judgment we notice in the order in which they are presented by counsel.
1. There was no error in allowing the plaintiffs to amend the
petition so as to increase the amount claimed as damages.
2. There was no error in the action of the court in allowing
witnesses to testify as to the condition of the passenger-room
with respect to tobacco smoke. The evidence was proper as
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part of the transaction out of which the injury arose, and as
showing why the plaintiffs did not remain in the passenger
room, or return to it. The effect of this circumstance upon
the rights of the parties was not stated to the jury. It would
not justify the plaintiftf in violating a knowif rule of the
company, if there was one, as to the particular. place where
passengers were required to enter their cars.
But I have no hesitation in saying, that, without any statute
enacting it, there is a common law duty on these companies to
provide reasonable accommodations at stations for the passengers who are invited and expected to travel on their roads.
See Caterham B. B. Co. v. London B. B. Co., 87 Eng. C. L.
410. If the station room is full, or if it is intolerably offensive,
by reason of tobacco smoke, so that a passenger had good reason for iot remaining there, while this will not justify him in
violating reasonable rules and regulations of the company,
which are known to him, respecting the place, mode and time
of entering the cars, it will justify his endeavor to enter the
cars at as early a period as possible, especially if it is dark and
cold without, if in so doing he uses proper care and violates no
rule or regulation of the company of which he has actual knowledge, or which, as a reasonable.man, he would be bound tb
presume existed. He would not, of course, be justified, by the
condition of the passenger room, in rashly endeavoring to board
a train in motion, or the like; but if the train had arrived, was
on the track, the car doors open, and if, as is frequently if not
generally the case, passengers are allowed, or at least not forbidden, to enter the cars before they are drawn up in front of
the station, we think a passenger may reasonably and properly
make the attempt to reach and enter the cars, if he is not
aware of any rule or regulation to the contrary; and if he receives an injury, in so doing (he using proper care), from the
unsafe -nd dangerous condition of the platform or the steps
in a plate where passengers would naturally go, the company
are liable therefor.
This subject, and some of the leading and recent decisions
bearing upon it, will be alluded to in considering the instructions of the court to the jury.
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3. There was evidence tending to show that theinjuries to the
wife were permanent in their nature, and likely to disable
her during her life from rendering effectual service to her
husband and fanily in the discharge of her household duties;
and that in consequence a woman had been and was and prob.
ably would have to be employed to do the work she had been
accustomed to perform.
Under these circumstances there was no error in the ad.
mission of the Carlisle tables to show the expectancy of the
life of the wife. It was shown, that, at the plaintiff's age, the
expectancy of life was about fifteen years.
If the jury believed the injury was permanent, and that it
would disable the plaintiff for life from doing labor, the
length of time that she would probably live affords some data
proper for the jury to consider in determining the amount
of pecuniary damage occasioned by the injury.
At common law where the action was for a tortious injury
to a married woman, the husband suing alone might recover
for the expenses of a cure, for loss of service, and of the society
of Itis wife. But in a suit in the name of the husband and
wife, the cause of action was the injury to the wife, and the
recovery was limited to damages for that injury, including, of
course, the mental sufferings of the wife, and did not embrace
the injury to the husband, who alone was liable to pay the
medical attendant, and who alone was considered dammfied by
the loss of the services and society of his wife. Fuller and
Wife v. R. 1. Co., 21 Conn. 557, 571; 2 Redf. on Railways
213, 3d ed. But our statute has changed the common law
rule as to parties in such cases. Rev. 2775. This provides
that "in an action brought by a man and his wife for an. injury done to the wife, in respect of which she is necessarily
joined as co-plaintiff, it shall be lawful for the husband tojoin
thereto claims in his own right." See Rev. § 2771.
This was done in the present case. If there were doubt as
to the propriety of the testimony as tending to show the
extent of the injury to the wife, there can be none as to its
propriety as tending to show the extent to whic it, would
deprive the husband of the services of the wife..
VOL. XVIII.-2.
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4. The point that the agreement of the plaintiffs with Mr.
Latham was champertous, does not appear to have been pre.
sented to the District Court. This agreement was set up in
the answer as showing that the proper parties plaintiff had
not joined in the action. The point made was, that Latham,
by virtue of this agreement was a real party in interest, and
ought to have been a party to the action.
The court held, that this was not such an assignment as
would defeat the right to recover (see 4th instruction refused),
or make it necessary that Latham should be a party plaintiff
(see 3d paragraph of court's charge). And in this view the
court was correct.
5. It is next insisted' that the court erred in refusing to
instruct as prayed by the defendant, and also in the charge of
its own to the jury. The view taken by the courtbelow will
appear from the instructions refused and given, which are set
out in the statement of the case and need not be here repeated.
By recurring to the court's charge in chieg it will be seen
that it made the defendant's liability turn upon the question
whether the step, which caused the accident, was loose. The
jury wbre told in the charge that, if one of the steps was loose
and not nailed down, by reason of which- the accident happened, the defendant is liable unless th6' Ia'ntifs own want
of care contributed to the injury; and such want of care does
not exist if the jury find that an ordinarily' prud&i person
would have gone down the steps of the platform, and would
not have waited until the passenger cars were opposite the
passenger depot. See paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the charge.
These instructions assume, and necessarily'imply, that the
plaintiffs had the right to enter the cars whenana Iwhere they
attempted it, if an ordinarily prudent person would have pursued the course which the plaintiffsdid, that is, if such persons would have gone down the steps and not have waithd for
the cars to be drawn up to the piatform opp6sife the passenger depot.
The law on this subject is this:
Railroad companies are held to a strict rule of accountability for the safety of passengers. This is salutary and righL
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To enable them properly to discharge this duty, they have the
power to make reasonable rules and regulations. They may
make such rules and regulations respecting the time, mode and
place of entering cars. Thee, when knoum to the passenger,
whether they have ever been written or published, or are posted
up or not, he is bound to conform to; and he cannot violate
them, and pursue another course, and hold the company liable
fkr damages thus occasioned, and which would have"been
avoidedby conforming to the rules and regulations or the company, even though the jury may believe that an ordinarily
prudent person would or might have adopted the same course.
A railroad company has a right to require all paskengers
about to enter their cars, to do so only when the cars are
brought up to the platform for that purpose.
We cannot say that it is a rule of law that the mere existence of a platform in front of a depot is necessarily notice to
the passenger that the train will be drawn up at that place to
receive him, and that the company requires that he shall wait
and enter tle cars at that place, and is prohibited from entering them elsewhere.
In many places passengers are required or allowed by the
companies to enter trains elsewhere than from the platform in
front of the passenger station or depot. In many places, also,
railroad companies fail to discharge a duty which they owe
to the traveling public, by leaving them, without any assistance, to find out as best they can where the train is which
they wish to take, how to reach, and when and where to enter it. Few persons traveling in strange places and on strange
roads but have experienced the embarrassment arising from
the failure of the company to have sign-boards, or officers, or
agents in attendance to give information of this character.
See observations of MAULE, J., to the jury in Martin v. 1B. R.
a., 81 Eng. 0. L. on pp. 186, 187.
A company may require trains to be entered at a particular
place, as, for instance, in front of the passenger depot. Often
however, there is no such requirement, and passengers are
allowed, or at least not forbidden, to enter elsewhere.
Applying these general principles to the case in hand, we
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are of opinion that the instructions asked by the defendaut
were faulty, in so far as they assume, as a matter of law, that
it is the duty of a passenger, irrespective of ary knowledge on
his part of any rule or regulation, to wait, before entering the
cars, until he train is drawn up in front of .the passenger
depot or platform.
If he knew that it was to be thus drawn up, and that pas.
sengers were expected and required to wait until this should
be done before entering the cars, he could not, with such
knowledge, be justified in seeking to enter the cars in an unusual place and at an unusual time, and hold the company
for damages thus occasioned Why? Because he is not in
the line of hig duty and in the exercise of his lawful rights at
the time.
If the plaintiffs attempted to enter the cars at a place which
they knew, or, from the nature of the circumstances surrounding them, ought to have known, was not prepared or designed
for receiving passengers, and at which they knew, or from the
circumstances ought to have known, the company did not allow passengers to enter, the company would not be liable as
common carriersupon their contract--however it might be if
they had not been declared against in this capacity-for an injury happening in the prosecution of such an attempt. Why?
The answer is, that, in making such an attempt, the plaintifis
would not be in the line of their duty, or in the exercise of any
right conferredupon them by theircontract with the company.
Applying the general -principles before expressed to the
charge of the court, and it is obvious that the minds of the
jury were not directed to the proper grounds on which the
defendant's liability or non-liability would depend., The jury
should have been directed to ascertain from the evidence
whether the railroad company had designated or set apart
the platform as the place where it required all passengers to
enter the cars.
If so, and this was known to the plaintiffs, and they, in disregard of such requirement, and in advance of time, and without justification for so doing, sought to enter the cars at an.
other place, and in so doing, the wife met with the injuiy for
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which she sues, the company ia not liable in this action as
common carriers; and this is the capacity in which it is sued.
If, on the other band, there was no rule or regulation
known to the plaintiffs requiring them to enter at the platform, and they, in good faith, and using reasonable care, were
seeking to find and enter the cars, the defendant -wodd be
liable for an injury caused by the defective platform or steps
leading to it, since the plaintiffs, it being dark or nearly so,
would have a right to presume that the platform and its apapproaches were in a safe condition.
We will not undertake to lay down any rule applicable to
the ever varied circumstances of all cases which may arise.
The gist of such an action as the present, if no known rule or
regulation of the company, reasonable in its character, has
been violated, is negligence; and what constitute6 negligence,
so as to give an action, it is impossible to define in a rule which
shall comprehend all cases.
The recent adjudications in the cases below cited, have been
carefully examined, and they warrant us in laying down the
general principles before expressed. Upon reason, that is, enlightened common sense, applied to the relation which railway companies sustain to the public, and applied to the na.
ture of man and the mode in which the business of carrying
passengers is practically and usually transacted, and upon the
authority of decided cases, we are justified in laying down the
following general rule as to the duty of such companies, to wit,
that they. are bound to keep in a safe condition all portions of
their platforms and approaches thereto to which the public do
or would naturally resort, and allportions of their station ground
reasonably near to the platforms, where passengers or those
who have purchased tickets with a view to take passage on
their cars, would naturally or ordinarily be likely to go.
Burgess v. R. R. Co., unfenced hole in station ground near
depot building, 95 Eng. 0. L. 923 (1858); Afartin v. . 1?.
Co, defective light in station grounds where passengers would
naturally go, 81 id. 179 (1855); Cornman v. 1. R. Co. 4 Hurl-

stone & Nor. 781 (1859); remarks of

MARTIMN,

B., and

WAT-

sox, B., as to open place in platform; Crafter v. R. R. (o.,
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12 Jur. N. S. 272; S. C., 1 Law R. 0. P. 300 (1866); Loigmore v. B. R. Co., 19 0. B., N. S. 183; S. C., 115 Eng. 0. L.
183 (1865); Sawyer v. R.,B. Co., 27 Verm. 377; Hurch v. .
R. Co., 9 Foster, 9, 39, 40, remarks of BELL, J.; Frost v. A
R. Co., 10 Allen 387 (1865).
For the error before mentioned in the instructions of the
court, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for
a new trial in accordance with. the rules and principles of law
herein expressed.
We have studied the foredoing opin. both modes of transportation are made
ion with an extraordinary degree of habitual and constant with the comattention and interest, because it af- pany; that is, so long as the mode of
fects a very difficult question in the transportation is exceptional with the
LWof passenger transportation, and company, the obligation, rights and
one that is, in some sense, fundamental duties of the respective parties must
to the responsibility of the company, depend upon the contract, and the
the security of passengers, in a some- reasonable implications and expectations growing out of it. But in such a
whatwideileld. if passengers can only
case the passenger for a single instance,
claim immunity from njury in going,
and while entering upon the cars at
in the most direct path, to the pasa freight station even at his own
senger station, and from thence, in
request, has the right to expect that
the most usual route, into the car- the surroundings of the freight station
riage, the responsibility of the com. shall be necessarily safe and reliable,
pany is considerably narrowed from
to bear such weight and pressure as
what it has hitherto been generally
may be expected daily to be placed
understood to be.
There is, unquestionably, some rea- upon them. And if one, under those
son to rejoice that the extreme degree circumstances, had been injured preof care, which the law imposes upon cisely as this plaintiff was, there could
passenger carriers, in regard to all the be no question whatever of his right.
and to recover.

appliances of the transportation
its incidents, is to be restricted within
such limits as will fairly and reasonably answer the necessities and conveniences of the business. If the passenger station and all its accessories are
complete and perfect in all their detail,
probably nothing more can be required
of the company in that regard. If the
passenger, for his own convenience,
desires to .be carried upon a freight
train or an engine, upon an emergenoy, unless the one or the other, or

But the present case is, in some
respects, not so favorable for the plaintiffs as that would have been. If the
plaintiffs had been permitted to take
passage upon a freight train, and were
approaching the goods station for that
purpose, and the steps forming the
approach or one of the approaches
had failed in the way it did here no,
one could question the liability of the
company for the injury.- The steps
were made by the company,or their
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agent, to be used in the ordinary mode,
by all kinds of persons having occasion to use them for reaching or leavIng the freight station. The plaintiffs
In the case supposed, being rightfully
in the use of them, at the time, would
have the right to expect that they
would prove safe for that use, and if
the; failed to do so it was the fault of
company, and they would clearly be
responsible.
And in the present case there seems
to be but one question which can
fairly admit of any doubt, and that is,
how far the plaintiffs may fairly be
rsgarded as rightfully in the use of the
steps, at the time the injury occurred.
This must of necessity be mainly a

by the same number of persons of all
ages and conditions as the other must
be. 2. The law imposes no such extreme degree of responsibility in the
one case as in the other. We are not
prepared to say, if the damage In the
present case had occurred from the
want of a baluster or railing at the
steps, or from the want of warning
where the offset was, or from #ny other
defect, which might be properly required to be supplied at a passenger
station, where all the passengers might
be expected to go, lint which would
not at all be expected at a goods station, although liable to be occasionally

used by passengers, that in such a case
the plaintiffs could claim any indemquestion of fact. Where the goods
nity against the company. But this
station and the passenger station are
injury occurred from no such defect or
so nearly together, and connected by
omission, but from one that was fatal
the same continuous platform, as in to the very structure for all uses, which
the present case, it is but natural to rendered it a mere trap or delusion,
exect thai emergencies must occa- and equally unsafe for all uses.
stoally occur, where passengers would
If then the jury regarded the plainbe likely to pass these steps, situated
tifs,under the instructions of the court,
as they were, along the same platform.
which seem to be unexceptionable upon
And if so, it would certainly be their
this point as rightfully in the use of
duty to passengers, as well as to the
these steps and fairly to be regarded
consignor and consignee of goods, to
as rightfully in the place where the
keep the entire platform safe for all injury occurred, there can be no quesordinary use, which passengers or tion whatever they were fully entitled
freight might fairly be expected to 'to demand indemnity of the company.
demand and exercise for their reason- There are a considerable number of
able convenience, and all persons in cases bearing more or less upon the
the lawful use of any portion of such question of the duty of the company
platform had the right to demand this to render stairways and passages reareasouable security in such use.
sonably safe, where falling in the direct
It is perhaps not reasonable to ex- and natural way of passengers. The
pect the approaches toa freight station English courts do not there seem into be constructed and guarded with the clined to any extreme degree of cauamine degree of extreme caution which tion on the part of the company, suc
would be demanded at a passenger as the accident might reveal the constation. 1. Because there is not the venience and security in having. Crafsame necessity, in the former case, as ger v. Metropolitan Railwalj, law Rep.
lnthe latter. The one is not expected 1 C. p. 300; S.C. 12 Jur. N. 8. 22;
tobeUsed, atallhoursofdayandnight, Lonnwore v. The GreW Weuiern Rait-
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way, 19 C. B. N. S. 183; Rigg v. Shef- gers to be allowed to enter the cam
riages, at any time suiting their own
Aed & L. Bailway, 12 Jur. X. S. 524.
The principal case seems to have convenience, and when that is habitually permitted, the, passenger is cerbeen made to turn to someextentupon
not in fault for attempting to
tainly
in
recompany
the regulations of the
do what others are constantly oermitgard to the time and mode ofpassengers
remon
taking thecars. We should regardany ted to do, without rebuke or
thing is
such regulations, unless in some way strance. Every time any such
suffered it is an open declaration og the
made known to persons purchasing
company, that it, is regular and right
tickets, or reasonably advertised to all,
they cannot, afterward,
by the arrangements of the station- to do so; and
some accident occurs, in consenouse and the platform, so that all when
quence of the continuance of the same
passengers would be likely to notice
themselves on the
them, as not being of obligation upon practice, shield
ground that the course pursued was
passengers, who In point of fact had
regulano knowledge of them. Railway com- irregulai, or contrary to the
panies who desire passengers not to tions. The most satisfactory, and the
leave the station-house and waiting only conclusive evidence of the regularooms until the departure of the trains, tions of a corporation, as of the
must take the ordinary precautions to principles of a man, is that which is
prevent it. That is universal upon the to be fairly inferred from his or its
continent of Europe and to some extent daily hfe and conduct.
But when a passenger assumes to
In this country. And it is the only
the cars at an exceptional place,
enter
effectual mode of securing the observance of any such regulation. If pas- or in an exceptional manner, he must
sengers see other passengers passing be able to notify the triers, that cirout at pleasure, upon and along the cumstances existed, without his fault,
platform connected with the station, which fairly justified him in attemptthey will naturally, and by conse- ing such an exceptional course. And
quence, rightfully understand, that it of this the jury maust be regarded as the
Is permitted by the company. Any only judges, where there is any eviregulations, therefore, forbidding the dense tending to prove a Justification.
passengers to pass out of the station There seems to have been inthe present
before the arrival and departure of the
ears, when every moment its violation
and disregard is permitted, must be
regarded as waived and abandoned.
And so in regard to the passengers

case, good reason for the departure
from the usual course. An uninhabitable waiting room is the same as none
at all. And if railway passenger carriers expect passengers to remain with-

oeing permitted to traverse the entire
range of a continuous platform like
the one here, having avn offset and
steps, it must depend very much upon
the apparent openness of the passage
and its proximity to the passenger
train, and the occasions one might
have to adopt that course.
It IS not very uncommon for passen-

in the waiting rooms until the carriages
are drawn up to the platform, they
should first render them habitable, and
then enforce the regulation upon all.
And if they allow passengers to wander
at will upon these platforms, connected
with these station-houses, they must
construct them in such a manner am
to be ordinarily safe for that use. Or
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If Ia any portion they are not so con.
utructed, or for any reason, it is not
expected passengers will use them
throughout their full extent, in all
such rightful emergency as may seem
to demand such use, they should take
some positive and sensible means of
securing their exclusion from the pro.
hibited portion. Passengers wil naturally take any open passage leading to
the place which theydesign or desire
to reach. And if any such passages remain open about passenger stations,
which passengers, on any emergency,
not produced by their own fault, will
be likely to take, the company should
be held responsible for the consequences until they take the precaution
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to fence off such passage. This is upon
the same principle, that one who has
an open well or any other dangerous
place about his premises, is bound to
fence it off, or he will be held respon.
sible for any injury occurring to any
person rightfully there. Burnes v.
Made 2 Car. & K. 661. This general
subject was largely discussed in a
recent case in the House of Lords.
,"he Mfersey Docks and HBarbor Board
v. Ruhallow, Law Rep. 1 Ho. Lds. 93;
8. C. 12 Jur. X. S. 571. So also as
bearing uponthe same question. Metcalfe v. Hatherington, 5 H. & N. 719;
C7e v. Wsse. 10 Ju. N..S. 1019.
L .

Supreme Court of the United States.
L. P. WOODRUFF et al. v. JOHN PARHAM.
The provision of the National Constitution. that no State shall, without the
consent of Congress, levy anyimposts or duties on imports orexports, extends
alone to articles brought into a State from a foreign country, and has no appllcation to articles brought from one State into another ; hence this provision
does not prohibit a State from taxing articles brought into it for sale from a
sister State, even though when taxed they are in the original or unbroken
package.
A State law authorizing a tax on all sales of merchandise, whether the goods
sold be the produce of that State or some other, and not discriminating against
the produce of sister States or'their citizens, is valid, even though the articles
were sold at wholesale in the original and unbroken packages.
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, and other cases commented on and distinguished from the present case by MILLDR, J.

In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MImLER, J.-The charter of Mobile authorizes that city to

impose a tax for municipal purposes on real and personal estate,
auction sales and sales of merchandise, capital employed in
business, and income within the city. The plaintiff in error
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having sold as auctioneer and commission merchant a
large amount of goods for others, and also on his own account,
claims that as to such goods as were brought into the State
of Alabama from other States of the Union, and sold by him
at wholesale in the original and unbroken packages, he is not
liable to the tax which the ordinances of the city impose upon
all sales of merchandise.
The case was heard in the courts of the State of Alabama
upon an agreed statement of facts, and that statement fully
raises the question, whether merchandise brought from other
States, and sold under the circumstances stated, comes within
the prohibition of the Federal Constitution, that no State
shall, without'the consent of Congress, levy any imposts or
duties on imports or exports. And it is claimed that it also
brings the case within the principles laid down by this court
in Brown v. The State of MYaryland, 12 Wheaton 419.
That decision has been recognized for over forty years as
governing the action of this court in the same class of cases,
and its reasoning has been often cited and received with approbatin in others to which it was applicable. We do not
now propose to question its authority, or to depart from its
principles.
The tax of the State of Maryland, which was the subject
of controversy in that case, was limited by its terms to importers of foreign articles or commodities, and the proposition
that we are now to consider is, whether the provision of the
Constitution to which we have referred extends, in its true
meaning and intent, to articles brought from oie State of the
Union into another.
The subject of the relative rights and powers of the Federal
and State Governments in regard to taxation, always delicate,
has acquired an importance by reason of the increased public
burdens growing out of the recent war, which demands of all
who may be. called in the discharge of public duty to decide
upon any of its various phases, that it shall be done with
great care and deliberation. Happily for us, much the larger
share of these responsibilities rests with the legislative departments, of the Stale and Federal Governments. But when
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under the pressure of a taxation necessarily heavy, and in many
cases new in its character, the parties affected by it resort to
the courts to ascertain whether their individual rights have
been-infringed by legislation,-and assert rights supposed to be
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, they, in every such
case properly brought before us, devolve upon this court an
obligation to decide the question raised from which there is
no escape.
The words impost, imports, and exports, are frequently used
in the Constitution. They have a necessary correlation; and
when we have a clear idea of what either word means in any
particular connection in which it may be found, we have one
of the most satisfactory tests of its definition in other parts of
the same instrument.
In the case of Brown v. Maryland,the word imports, as used
in the clause now under consideration, is defined, both on the
authority of the lexicons and of usage, to be articles brought
into the country; and impost is there said to be a duty, custom, or tax levied on articles brought into the country. In
the ordinary use of these terms at this day, no one would, for
a moment, think of them as having relation to any other articles than those brought from a country foreign to the United
States, and ar the time the case of Brown v. Maryland was decided-namely, in 1827-it is reasonable to suppose that the
general usage was the same, and that in defining imports as
articles brought into the country, the chief justice used the
word country as a synonym for United States.
But the word is susceptible of being applied to articles introduced from one State into another, and we must inquire if
it was so used by the framers of the Constitution.
Iaving, then, for a moment, the clause of the Constitution
under consideration, we find the first use of any of these correlative terms in that clause of the eighth section of the first
article which begins the enumeration of the powers confided
to Congress.
"The Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises, * * but all duties, imposts,
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
-1, the word impost, here used, intended to confer upon
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Congress a distinct power to levy a tax upon all goods or mer.
chandise carried from one State into another ? Or is the power
limited to duties on foreign imports? If the former be intended, then the power conferred is curiously rendered nugatory by the subsequent clause of the ninth section, which declares that no tax shall be laid on articles exported from any
State, for no article can be imported from one State into an.
other which is not, at the same time, exported from the former.
But if we give to the word imposts, as used in the first mentioned clause, the definition of Chief Justice Marshall, and to
the word export the corresponding idea of something carried
out of the United States, we have, in the power to lay duties
on imports from abroad, and the prohibition-to lay such duties
on exports to other countries, the power and its limitations
concerning imposts.
It is also to be remembered that the convention was here
giving the right to lay taxes by national authority in connection with paying the debts and providing for the common defense and general welfare, and it is a reasonable inference that
they had in view, in the use of the word imports, those arti.
cles which, being introduced from other nations and diffused
generally over the country for consumption, would contribute
in a common and general vjay, to the support of the National
Government. If internal taxation should become necessary,
it was provided for by the terms taxes and excises.
There are two provisions of the clause under which cxemption from State taxation is claimed in this case, which are not
without influence on that prohibition, namely: that any State
may, with the assent of Congress, lay a tax on imports, and
that the net produce of such tax shall be for the benefit of the
treasury of the United States. The framers of the Constitution claiming for the general government, as they did, all the
duties on foreign goods imported into the country, might
well permit a State that wished to tax more heavily than
Congress did, foreign liquors, tobacco, or other articles injurious to the community, or which interfered with their domestic policy, to do so, provided such tax met the approbation of
Congress, and was paid into the Federal treasury. But that
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it was intended to permit such a tax to be imposed by such
authority onthe products of neighboring States for the use of
the Federal Government, and that Congress, under this temptatiog, was to arbitrate between the State which proposed to levy
che tax and those which opposed itseems altogether improbable.
Yet this must be the construction of the clause in question
if it has any reference to goods imported from one State into
another.
If we turn for a moment from the consideration of the language of the Constitution, to the history of its forniation and
adoption, we shall find additional reason to conclude that the
words imports and imposts were used with exclusive reference to articles imported from foreign countries.
Section three, article six, of the Confederation, provided that
no State should lay imposts or duties which might interfere
with any stipulation in treaties entered into by the United
Sates; and section one, article nine, that no treaty of commerce
should be made whereby the legislative power of the respective
States should be restrained from imposing such imposts and
duties on foreigners as their own people were subjected to, or
from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species
of goods or commodities whatsoever. In these two articles of
the Confederation, the words imports, exports, and imposts are
used with exclusive reference to foreign trade, because they
have regard only to the treaty-making power of the Federation.
As -soon as peace was restored by the success of the revolution, and commerce began to revive, it became obvious that
the most eligible mode of raising revenue for the support of
the general government and the payment of its debts, was by
duties on foreign merchandise imported into the country. The
Congress accordingly reconimended the States to levy a duty
of five per cent. on all such imports, for the use of the Confederation. To this, Rhode Island, which, at that time, was one
of the largest importing States, objected, and we have a full
report of the remonstrance addressed by a committee of Congress to that State on that subject.--(1 Elliot's Debates 131-3.)
And the discussions of the Congress of that day, as imperfectly
as they have been preserved, are full of the subject of the
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injustice done by the States who had good seaports, by duties
levied in those ports' on foreign goods designed for States who
had no such ports.
In this state of public feeling. in this matter, the Constitutional Convention assembled.
Its very first grant of power to the new government about to
be established, was to lay and collect imposts or duties on foreign goods imported into the country, and among its restraints
upon the States, was the corresponding one that they should lay
no duties on imports or exports. It seems, however, from Mr.
Madison's account of the debates, that while the necessity of
vesting in Congress the power to levy duties on foreign goods
was generally conceded, the right of the States to do so likewise
was not given up without discussion, and was finally yielded
with the qualification to which we have already referred, that
the States might lay such duties with the assent of Congress.
Mr. Madison moved that the words "nor lay imposts or duties
on imports" be placed in that class of prohibitions which were
absolute, instead of those which were dependent on the consent
of Congress. His reason was that the States interested in this
power (meaning those who had good seaports), by which they
could tax the imports of their neighbors passing through their
markets, were a majority, and could gain the consent of Congress, to the injury of New Jersey, North Carolina, and other
non-importing States. But his motior failed. (5 Madison
Papers 486.) In the convention of Virginia, called to adopt
the Constitution, that distinguished expounder and defender of
the instrument, so largely the work of his own hand, argued.
in support of the authority to lay direct taxes, that without this
power a disproportion of burden would be imposed on the
Southern States,because having fewer manufactures,they would
consume more imports and pay more of the imposts. (3 Elliot's
Debates 248.) So, in defending the clause of the Constitution
now under our consideration, he says: "Some States export the
produce of other States. Virginia exports the produce of North
Carolina; Pennsylvania those of New Jersey and Delaware;
and Rhode Island those of Connecticut and Massachusetts.
The exportirg States wishedto retain the power of laying duties
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on exports, to enable them to pay expenses incurred. The
States whose produce was exported by other States, were
extremely jealous lest a contribution should be raised of them
by the exporting States, by laying heavy duties. on their own
commodities. If this clause be fully considered it will be
found to be more consistent with justice and equity than any
other practicable mode: for if the States had the exclusive
imposition of duties on exports, they might raise a heavy contribution of the other States for their own exclusive emolu
ments."-(2 Elliot's Debates 443-4). Similar observations
from the same soirce are found in the forty-second number
of the Federalist, but with more direct referenci to the power
to regulate commerce.
Gov. Elsworth, in opening the debate of the Connecticut convention on the adoption of the Constitution, says : "Our being
tributary to our sister States, in consequence of the want of a
Federal system. The State of New York raises £60 or £80,000
in a year by impost. Connecticut consumes about one-third of
the goods upon which this impost is laid, and consequently pays
bne-third of this sum to New York. If we import by the
medium of Massachusetts,' she has an impost, and to her we
pay tribute."--(2 Elliot's Debates 192.) A few days later
he says: "I find, on calculation, that a general impost'of five
per cent. would raise a sum of £245,000," and adds, "it is a
strong argument in favor of an impost, that the collection of it
will interfere less with the internal police of the State than*any
It does not fill the country with
other species of taxation.
revenue officers, but is confined to the sea-coast, and is chiefly
a water operation. * * * If we do not give it to Congress.
the individual States will have it."--(2 Elliot's Debates 196.)
It is not too much to say that, so far as our research has
extended, neither the word export, import, nor impost is to be
found in the discussions bn this subject, as they have come
down to us from that time, in reference to any other than foreign
commerce, without some special form of words to show that
foreign commerce is not meant. The only allusion to imposts
in the articles of confederation, is clearly limited to duties on
goods imported from forein States. Wherever we find the
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grievance to be remedied by this provision of the Constitution
alluded to, the duties levied by the States on foreign importations, is alone mentioned, and the advantages to accrue to Congress from the power confided to it, and withheld from the States,
is always mentioned with exclusive reference to foreign trade.
Whether we look, then, to the terms of the clause of the Constitution in question, or its relation to the other parts of that
instrument, or to the history of its formation and adoption, or
to comments of the eminent men who took part in these
transactions, we are forced to the conclusion that no intention
existed to prohibit, by this clause, the right of one State to tax
articles brought into it from another. If we examine for a
moment the results of an opposite doctrine, we shall be well
satisfied with the wisdom of the Constitution as thus construed.
The merchant of Chicago, who buys his goods in New York,
and sells at wholesale in the original packages, may have his
millions employed in trade for half a life-time and escape all
State, county and city taxes, for all that he is worth is invested
in goods, which he claims to be protected as imports from New
York. Neith6r the State nor the city, which protects his life
and property, can make him contribute a dollar to support its
government, improve its thoroughfares, or educate its children.
The merchant in a town of Massachusetts, who deals only in
wholesale, if he purchases his goods in New York, is exempt
from taxation. If his neighbor purchases in Boston, he must
pay ull the taxes which Massachusetts levies with equal justice on the property of all its citizens.
These cases are merely mentioned as illustrations. But itis
obvious that if articles brought from one State into another are
exempt from taxation, even under the limited circumstances
laid down in the case of Brown v. Mfaryland, the grossest injustice must prevail, and equality of public burdens in all
our large cities is impossible.'
It is said, however, that, as a court, we are bound, by our
former decisions, to a contrary doctrine, and we are referred
to the cases of Almy v. State of California,24: Howard 169,
and Brown v. Afaryland, 12 Wheaton 419, in support of the
assertion.
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The case first mentioned arose under a statute of California,
which imposed a stamp tax on bills of lading for the transportatiou of gold and silver from any point within the State to
any point without the State.
The master of the ship Ratler was fined for violating this
law, -byrefusing to affix a stamp to a bill of lading for gold
shipped on board his vessel from San Francisco to New York,
It seems to have escaped-the attention of counsel on both sides,
and of the chief justice who delivered the opinion, that the case
was one of inter-state commerce. No distinction of the kind is
taken by counsel, none alluded to by the court, except in the
incidental statement of the terminiof the voyage. In the language of the court, citing Brown v. 3faryland as governing the
ease, the statute of Maryland is described as a tax on foreign
articles and commodities. The only question disussed by the
court is, whether the bill of lading was so intimately connected
with the articles of export described in it that a tax on it was a
tax on the articles exported. And, in arguing this proposition,
the chief justice says, that "a bill of lading, or some equivalent
instrunent of writing, is invariably associated with every cargo
of merchandise exported to a foreign country, and consequently
a duty upon that is, in substance and effect, a duty on the
article exported." It is impossible to examine the opinion
without perceiving that the mind of the writer was exclusively
directed to foreign commerce, and there is no reason to suppose
that the question which we have discussed was in his thought.
We take it to be a sound ptinciple, that no proposition of law
can be said to be overruled by a court which was not in tht.
mind of the court when the decision was made.-YTe 7'icto,
6 Wall, 382.
The case, however, was well decided, on the ground taken by
Mr. Blair, counsel for defendant, namely: that such a tax was
a regulation of commerce, a tax imposed upon the transportat1on of goods from oneState to another, over the high seas, and
in conflict with that freedom of transit of goods and person
between one State and another, which is within the rule laid
down in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wallace 35, and with the
authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the States.
VoL XVII. - 3
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We do not regard it, therefore, as opposing the views -which
we have announced in this case.
The case of Brown v. Maryland, as we have already said,
arose out of a statute of that State, taxing, by way of discrimi.
nation, importers who sold by wholesale foreign goods.
And Chief Justice MARSHALL, in delivering the opinion of
the court, distinctly bases the invalidity of the statute---1) On
the clause of the Constitution which forbids a State to levy
imposts or duties on imports; and (2) That which confers on
Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the States, and with the Indian tribes.
The casual remark, therefore, made in the close of the opinion, "that we suppose the principles laid down in this case to
apply equally to importations from a sister State," can only be
received as an intimation of what they might decide if the case
ever came before them, for no such case was then to be-decided.
It is not, therefore, a judicial decision of the question, even if
the remark was intended to apply to the first of the grounds on
which that decision was placed.
But the opinion in that case discusses, as we have said, under
two distinct heads, the two clauses of the Constitution which he
supposed to be violated by the Maryland statute, and the remark above quoted follows immediately the discussion of the
second proposition, or the applicability of the commerce clause
to that case.
If the court then meant to say that a tax levied on goods
from a sister State which was not levied on goods of a similar
character produced within the State, would be in conflict with
the clause of the Constitutibn giving Congress the right "to
regulate commerce among the States," as much as the tax on
foreign goods, then under consideration, was in conflict with
the authority "to regulate commbrce with foreign nations,"
then we agree to the proposition.
It may not be inappropriate here to refer to the license
cases (5 Howard 504).
The separate arid diverse opinions delivered by the judges on
that occasion leave it very doubtful if any material proposition
was decided, though the precise point we have here argued was
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before the court and seemed to require solution. But no one
can read the opinions which were delivered without perceiving
that none of them held that goods imported from one State
into another are within the prohibition to the States to levy
taxes ou imports, and the language of the chief justice and
Judge McLEA.r leave no doubt that their views were adverse
to the proposition.
We are satisfied that the question, as a distinct proposition
necessary to be decided, is before us now for the first time.
But, we may be asked, is there no limit to the power of the
States to tax the produce of their sister States brought within
their borders ? And can they so tax them as to drive them out
or altogether prevent their introduction or their transit over
their territory ?
The case before us is a simple tax on sales of merchandise,
imposed alike upon all sales made in Mobile, whether the sales
be made by a citizen of Alabama or of another State, and
whether the goods sold are the produce of that State or some
other. There is no attempt to discriminate injuriously against
the products of other States or the rights of their citizens, and
the case is not, therefore, an attempt to fetter commerce among
the States, or to deprive the citizens of other States of any privilege or immunity possessed by citizens of Alabama. But a
law having such operation would, in our opinionbe an infringement of the provisions of the Constitution which relate to those
subjects, and therefore void. There is also, in addition to the
restraints which those provisions impose by their own force on
the States, the unquestioned power of Congress, under the
authority to regulate commerce among the States, to interpose,
by the exercise of this power, in such a manner as to prevent
the States from any oppressive interference with the free interchange of commodities by the citizens of one Statewiththose
of another.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is affirmed.
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Supreme Court of the United States.
JOHN W. HINSON V. ELISHA B. LOTT.
The provision of the National Constitution against taxing imports by the
States, does not extend to articles brought from a sister State; therefore 9W
provision does not prohibit a State from taxing articles brought into it for sale
from another State, even though when taxed such property is in the originai
package; but anotherprovision of the Constitution, viz.: the commercial clause
does prohibit a State from passing tax iaws discriminating adversely to the
products of other States and in favor of its own, and which can be seen to
operate to fetter commerce among the States.
The principle of Woodruff v. Parham, Ante p. 26, affirmed andapplied toacase
where, although the mode of collecting the tax on the article made in the State
was different from the mode of collecting the tax on the articles brought from
another State into it, yet the amount paid was .in fact the same on the same
article in whatever State made.
!

In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-The plaintiff in error, a merchant of Mobile,
sets forth in his bill of complaint that he has 6n hand five barrels of whisky consigned to him by Dexter, of the State
of Ohio, to be sold on account of the latter in the State of
Alabama, and that he has five other barrels of whisky, purchased by himself in the State of Louisiana, and that he has brandy
and wine imported from abroad, all of which he holds and offers
for sale in the same packages in which they were imported, and
not otherwise. That the deputy tax collector for the county of
Mobile and State of Alabama, is about to enforce the collection
of State and county taxes on said liquors, for which he sets up
the authority of the 13th, 14th and 15th sections of chapter one
of an Act of the Alabama Legislature, approved February 22,
1866. He insists that this act is void as being in conflict with
the Constitution of the United States, and prays an injunction.
On final hearing the relief prayed was granted as to all
but the State tax, and relief as to what was granted as to goods
imported from abroad, but the State tax of fifty cents per gallon
on the whisky of Dexter, of Ohio, and that purchased by plaintiff in Louisiana was held to be valid.
Section thirteen of the statute referred to in this bill enacts
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"that before it lisall be lawful for any dealer or dealers in spirituous liquors to offer any such liquors for sale within the limits
of this State, such dealer or dealers introducing any such liquors
into the State for sale, shall first pay the tax collector of the
county into which such liquors are introduced, a tax of fifty
oents per gallon-upon eacli and every gallon thereof." The two
subsequent sections provide the mode of enforcing the collection of the tax thus imposed.
In the argument of this case, no reference has been made
to any other sections of the statute.
If this section stood alone in the legislation of Alabama on
the subject of taxing liquors, the effect of it would be that all
such liquors brought into the State from other States and offered
for sale, whether in the original casks by which they came into
the State or by retail in smaller quantities, would be subject to
a heavy tax, while the same class of liquors manufactured in
the State would escape the tax. It is obvious that the right to
impose any such discriminating tax, if it exist at all, cannot be
limited in amdunt, and that a tax under the same -authoritycan
as readily be laid, which would amount to an absolute prohibition to sell liquors introduced from without, while the privilege
wbuld remain unobstructed in regard to articles made in the
Sfite. And if this can be done in reference to liquors, it can
be ddne with reference to all the products of a sister State, and
in this mode one State can establish a complete system of nonintercourse in her commercial relations with allthe other States
of the Union.
"We have just decided in the case of Woodruzff v. Parham,
that the Constitutional provisions against taxing imports by the
States, does not extend to articles brought from a sister State.
But if this were otherwise, and we could hold that as to such
articles the rule laid down in Brown v. Mfaryland, concerning
foreign imports, applied, it would prevent but a very little of
the evil which we have described; for, under the decision in
that case, it is only while the goods so imported were held in
the original unbroken condition in which they came into the
State, and in the hands of the -first importer, that they would
beprotected from State taxation. As soon as they passed out
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of his hands into use, or were offered for sale among the community at large, they would be liable to a tax which might
render their use or sale impossible.
But while the case has been argued here with a principal
reference to the supposed prohibition against taxing imports, it
is to be seen from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama
delivered in this case, that the clause of the Constitution which
gives to Congress the right to regulate commerce among the
States, was supposed to present a serious objection to the validity of the Alabama statute. Nor can it be doubted that a
tax which so seriously affects the interchange of commodities
between the States as to essentially impede or seriously interfere
with it, is a regulation of commerce. And it is also true, as
conceded in that opinion, that Congress has the same right to
regulate commerce among the States that it has to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and that whenever it exercises
that power, all conflicting State laws must give way, and that
if Congress had made any regulation covering the matter in
question, we need inquire no further.
That court seems to have relieved itself of the objection by
holding that the tax imposed by the State of Alabama was an
exercise of the concurrent right of regulating commerce remaining with the States until some regulation on the subject had
been made by Congress. But, assuming the tax to be, as we
have supposed, a discriminating tax, levied exclusively upon fne
products of sister States, and looking to the consequences which
the exercise of this power may produce if it be once conceded,
amoitnting, as we have seen, to a total abolition of all commercial intercourse between the States, under the cloak of tle
taxing power, we are not prepared to admit that a State can
exercise such a power, though Congress may have failed to
act on the subject in any manner whatever.
The question of the nature of the power to regulate commerce
and how far that power is exclusively vested in Congress, has
always been a difficult one, and has seldom been construed in
this court with unanimity. In the very latest case on this
subject- Crandallv. Nevada, 6 Wallace, 35-the chief justice
and Mr. Justice CLIFFORD held that a tax on persons passing
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through the State by railroads or other public conveyances was
forbidden to the States by that provision of the Constitution
proprio vigore,and in the absence of any legislation by Congress
on the subject; while a majority of the court, preferring to
place the invalidity of the tax on other grounds, merely expremed their inability, on a review of the cases previously
decided, to take that view of the question. But in that case
tke opinion of the court in Cooley v. The Port Wards, 12
How. 299, was approved, which holds that there is a class of
legislatibn of a general nature, affecting the commercial interests of all the States, wI ich, from its essential character, is
national, and which must, so far as it affects these interests,
belong exclusively to the Federal Government.
The tax in the case before us, if it were of the character we
have suggested, discriminating adversely to the products of all
tle other States in favor of those of Alabama, and involving a
principle which might lead to actual commercial non-interbourse, would, in our opinion, belong to that class of legislation,
and be forbidden by the clause of the Constitution just
mientiorfed.
But a careful examination of that statute shows that it is not
obnoxious to this objection. A tax is imposed by the previous
sections of the same act of fifty cents per gallon on all whisky
and all brandy from fruits manufactured in the State. In order
to collect this tax, every distiller is compelled to take out a
license and to make regular returns of the amount of distilled
spirits manufactured by him. On this he pays fiity cents per
gallon. So that when we come in the light of these earlier
sections of the act, to examine the 13th, 14th and 15th sections,
it is found that no greater tax is laid on liquors brought into
the State than on those manufactured within it. Andit is clear
that whereas collecting the tax of the distiller was supposed to
be the most expedient mode of securing its payment, as to
liquors manufactured within the State, the tax on those who
sold liquors brought in from other States was only the complementary provision necessary to make the tax equal on all liquors
sold in the State. As the effect of the act is such as we have
described, and it institutes no legislation which discriminates
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against the products of sister States, but merely subjects them
to the sam rate of taxation which similar articles pay that 9re
manufactured within the State, we do not see in it an attempt
to regulate commerce, but an appropriate and legitimate fxercise of the taxing power of the States.
The decree of the Supreme Court of Alabama is therefore
affirmed.
"Few things are betterknown," says partment of Internal Commerce."
Mr. WznsTsn, "than the immediate
The above opinions, recently filed.
Causes which led to theadoption of the relate larigely to the same interesting
present Constitution, and there is
nothing, I think, clearer than that the
prevailing motive was to regulate cornmerm * * * Over whatever other

subject as to extent of the power to
regulate commerce, and will be re.
ceived and read by the profession and
by legislators with great interest.

interests of the country this Government may diffuse its benefits and its
blessings, it will always be true, as a
matter of historical fact, that it had its
immediate origin In the necessities of
commerce."-(6 Webst. Works, 9, 10.)
Accordingly, the National Constitution
conferred upon Congress, in express

By these decisions taken together,
the court has most wisely declared a
view which disables States from passing hostile or discriminating tax laws,
which have the effect to prevent that
free and unshackled commercial inter.
course, among the States, whin it was
a primary design of the Constitution

terms, the power to regulate commerce to secure.
Concisely stated, the case of Woodnot only with foreign nations, but
ruff v. Parham decides for the first
among the several States.
The nature and extent of this power time just this point, viz.: that the pro.
have heretofore presented questions of vision of the National Constitution
the most difficult character for adjudi- against taxing imports by the States
cation; and thek are still frequently "does not, in Its true meaning and in.
tent, apply to articles brought from one
arising,
In Gray v. The Clinton Bridge,7 Am. State of the Union into another."
Therefore, if this were the only protaw Reg., N. S., p. 149, thesame learned
justice by whom the foregoing opinions
were pronounced presented, as to the
extent of the commercial clause of
the National Constitution, some views
respectig the power of Congressional
control over railways, which attracted
general attention at the time, and
which will yet, it is predicted, be the

vision in the Constitution, there would
be no limit to the power of a State to
tax the manufactured articles and
products of other States, and this
power might be so exerted as to pro.
vent their introduction into a State,
and thus essentially interfere with
commercial intercourse among the

origin of legislation looking to the as. States.
Where, then, is the provision of the
sertion of such control, or, perhaps, as
suggested by Senator CARPENER, of Constitution which prohibits such leg.
Wisconsin, to the creation of a "De- islationt
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The question is aubwered by the case jidgment, did intend to express their
of BEn:0a v. Lo, which holds that such opinion to be tbu.t no State could
legislation is incondict with the corn- underthecloakofthe taingpower, authorize disriminatingtaxationagainst
mercial clause of that instrument.
If this case be critically viewed, It the products and citizens of sister
Congress mayhave
Is true that the law of Alabama, which States, even though
was before the court, did not discrimi. failed to act upon the subject.
It is distinctly held, however, that
nite against the products or citizens
brought into a State
eeecfrom
aohrSaemy(ihu
of any other State, and hence there property
another State may ( ithout reference
was no ground for claiming that it to its being in the original package or
was invalid, and no inevitable neces,

not) be taxed by the State; and such

uarily for the court to say what would, tax is valid where the law imposing
be the effect if the statute has made It does not discriminate in favor of its
own citizens or products, and against
Irjurious discriminations.
citizensor productsof other States.
the
both
reading
But It in manifest, on
J. F. D.
opinions, that the court, as it properly
might, in stating the grounds of its

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
JAMES HEFFERMAN v. ETHEL H. PORTER.
The laws of war authorize an occupying conqueror to establish such govern.
meart as he may deem proper, over hostile country in his occupation and
control
If in such case the commanding oficer establish a commission with the
powers, and to perform, for the time being, the duties of the courts of law, a
decision by such tribunal upon a case tried before it is binding and conclusive.
The judgment of the civil tribunal established by the United States military
commander n Tennessee, during the late war, may be pleaded in bar to an
action on the same cause in a State court after the war.

Error to the Law Court of Memphis.
Opinion of the court by
I L T. ELLETT, Special Judge.-This suit was brought by
Hefferman against Porter, in September, 1865. The defendant,
among other things, pleaded in bar the judgment of a tribunal
known as the Civil Commission, created by order of the commander of the United States forces in the District of Memphis, in
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April, 1863, before which, it is alleged, the plaintiff impleaded
the defendant concerning the same causes for which' the
present action is brought.
The plea alleges that the parties were both residents in the
District of Memphis, which was under martial law and military
rule, and that all civil courts were suspended therein; ano
that the Civil Commission was organized by the military commander of the said district, to hear and determine all complaints
and suits instituted by all loyal citizens of the United States,
for the collection of all debts, the enforcement of all contracts,
and in other respects to fill the place and perform the functions of the ordinary civil courts of the country for the time
being; and that persons were appointed to hold the said commission, their judgments and decisions to be binding and final
when approved by the said military commander. The commencement of proceedings before the said commission by the
plaintiff against the defendant, the identity of the causes of
action, the progress of the suit and the final judgment on
the merits in favor of the defendant, after full proof on both
sides, and due consideration by the court, with the approval
thereof by the military commander, are all averred in the
plea with technical precision.
To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the court over.
rulled the demurrer, and the plaintiff refusing to reply, final
judgment was entered for the defendant. There are other
pleas and demurrers in the record, but it is not necessary that
we should notice them.
The defendant seeks to give effect to the judgment of this
tribunal, as res judicata;while the plaintiff denies to it any
validity whatever, and insists that the proceeding was coram
non judice, and void.

No objection is stated to the organization of the court, its
mode of proceeding, or the forms of trial, judgment or execution;
but it is insisted that such a court is unknown to the Constitution and laws of the State or of the United States, and that it
was not within the power of the military commander to create it.
The legal principles essential to the proper solution of the
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question involved, seem to have been fully considered and
settled in several recent adjudications by this court.
In Rutledge v. Fogg, 3 Cold. 554, the principles of public
law applicable to the right of the conqueror to establish governments.in conquered territory, are thus stated: "Ordinarily the
right of one belligerant nation to occupy and govern the territory of the other while in its military possession, is one of the
incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer.
The Constitution, or political institutions of the conqueror,
are not, therefore, looked to for authority to establish a governnent for the teiritory of his enemy in his possession, during
its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers
of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority
and such rules are derived from the laws of war, as established
by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of
publicists and the decisions of courts."
Having thus asserted the principle of public law that prevails
in the case of international wars, the court proceeds to state
the rule in relation to territorial or civil wars, thus: " B at,
pending the war, the revolted territory actually occupied by
the military power of the United States is subject to the laws
of the belligerent occupation. The authority of the conqueror
in such a case is, ex necessitate, paramount.
His title rests on force, and is measured by it. He may
suspendthe municipal laws of theState or district thus occupied,
if the safety or interest of the parent government demands it; or
otherwise, by permission, the private or municipal laws of such
conquered territory remain in force. Under this doctrine, which
seems to be recognized by the laws of war, the President, in
the exercise of his Constitutional power as commander-in.chief
of the army and navy, and the military qficers under his autho-

rity, may, when war actually exists, whether it be territorial or
foreign, seize the enemy's possessions, andestablish a temporary
government and lawsffbr the territoryso seized and occupied."

And, in accordance with these views, it was held in that case
that the appointment of Andrew Johnson, by the Secretary of
War, to be military governor of the State of Tennessee, with
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power to establish all necessary offices, tribunals, etc, wah
legitimate and proper.
In Isbell v. Farris,5 Cold. 426, it was again asserted "that
in the civil war, the sovereign government of the nation, having
by military force, made conquest of and holding in firm occupation by such force, the country within the scope and boundary
in which the war existed, possessed the belligerent power to
organize and enforce the government of the people within the
country so occupied; and as a means of so organizing and
enforcing government, may rightfully appoint suitable functionaries, directly by the military commander of the forces
ocettpying the country, or through the agency of elections held
by the people themselves, pursuant to the orders of military
"The
* * * '*
* * * *
officers in command."
powers exercised by the military governor to establish government over the people, in the manner prescribed by the proclamation of January 7, 1864, find their sanction in the public
law which authorizes the sovereign belligerent in a civil war,
to exercise upon the insurgent people, to some extent, the
belligerent powers sanctioned by the laws of civil war in the
case of an international war.
The laws of war authorize the occupying conqueror to
organize and establish government over the people of the
hostile country, subdued and held in firm occupation. The
government so established endures for the time the belligerent
occupation continues, and ends with the restoration of peace,
and the resumption of the regular municipal government of
peace." There are other decisions in which the same principles
are recognized, to which it is unnecessary to make particular
reference.
These elaborate quotations are given to show that the question as to the power of the commander of the military forces of
the United States, in every district in the insurrectionary States,
held in firm possession by force of arms, during such belligerent
occupation to establish such temporary government in such
district, or any part thereof, as he might see proper, and to
appoint and control the necessary officers and agents, and to
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prescribe the modes in which such governments should be
administered, are not open questions in .this court.
The conclusions that have been thus announced are, moie.
over, in-accordance with the opinion of approved writers on
public law, and are sanctioned by the established usage and
practice of our government, and by the decisions of its highest courts: Halleck on Int. Law, 776, et seq.; Id. 830; U. S.
v. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164;
Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176.

The right to establish government is not at all dependent
upon the right of cbnquest, but is treated as incident to the
mere right of belligerent occupation. A nation canilot conquer
its own territory, but it may subdue and occupy such portions
of it as are made the theater of an insurrection against its
authority. The right to govern, for the time being, is necessarily embraced in the right of subjugation and occupation.
Halleck says: "If a fort, town, city, harbor, island, province
or partIcula'r section of country, belonging to one belligerent,
is forced to submit to the arms of the other, such place of
territory ifistantly becomes a conquest, and is subject to the
laws which the conqueror may impose on it; although he has
not yet acquired the plenum dominium et utile, he has the

temporary right of possession and government." p. 777.
Government of such territory, while so held in military occupation, is noless a dutythan a necessity, and the right to create
a government, or rather the right to govern, implies the right
to determine in what manner and through what agencies such
government is to be conducted. The municipal laws of the
place may be left in operation, or these may be suspended, and
other laws put in force. The administration of justice may be
left in the hands of the ordinary officers of the law, or these
may be superseded and others appointed in their place. Civil
rights and civil remedies may be suspended, and military laws,
and military courts and proceedings, may be substituted for
them, or new tribunals may be established, and new legal remedies and civil proceedings may be introduced. (Halleck 830.)
The conqueror exercises, for the time being, the powers of a
de facto government, and the jurisdiction and authority

O
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possessed and exercised by the tribunals created by him,
must depend upon his discretion.
In this respect, the act of every military commander is the
act of the commander-in-chief, until disapproved or annulled,
and is of necessity to be obeyed as such.
Whatever the President of the United States, as commanderin-chief, might do if personally present, may be done by the
superior officer in command of any district, unless restrained
by orders, or by the peculiar nature of the service in which
he is engaged.
The establishment of legal tribunals for the adjudication
and protection of civil rights, is the most favorable condition
for the conquered people. There is always more or less security
in a judicial body organized according to the forms of law,
for the administration of justice according to the rules that
obtain in courts of judicature. There is a dignity and responsibility about such a position that do not fail to command
a decent regard to the ordinary rules of justice and right, and
to mitigate the rigor of military rule to some degree of harmony with the humane theories of modern warfare.
If, then, the power to create such civil courts exists, by the
laws of war, in a place held in firm possession by a belligerent
military occupation, and if their judgments and decrees are
held to be binding on all parties, during the period of such
occupation, as the acts of a de facto government, we are not
able to see on what grounds we can refuse to them a like effect, when pleaded as res judcata,before the regular judicial
tribunals of the State, since the return of peace.
Our attention has been called to the action of the Judge
Advocate General of United States, in July and October,
1863, in two cses carried up to the Secretary of War from
the action of the provost marshal at Memphis, in undertaking
to adjudicate questions of civil right. In his report on these
cases to the Secretary of. War, the Judge Advocate General
adverts to the " Civil Commission" then existing in Memphis,
which he pronounces to be "an anomalous and irregular tribunal, entirely unauthorized by military law," and earnestly
advises that this, and any court or commission of like character be ordered by the Secretary of War to be dissolved.
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Theopinion ofthe Judge Advocate General is entitled to great
respect, but as it does not appear to have been adopted by the
.Secretary of War, or made the basis of his official action, it loses
much of its weight as authority.
The reasoning upon which the opinion was founded not being given, we are without the aid of the lights which guided
him to his conclusions.
Under these circumstances, and with great deference, we
feel constrained to adopt a different view of the subject.
The authorities already referred to, and the reason and
nature of the subject itself, we think sustains us in this view.
And In this connection we refer generally, in confirmation of
our opinion, to the able decision of Judge PEABODY, in the
case of 'eiter
v. United States, 4 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 534, in
which the validity of these special courts of justice, organized
under military authority, during the late war, and their rightful jurisdiction, not only in the most important civil matters,
but also in criminal cases of a capital nature, are most cogently
and persuasively vindicated.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

U. S. Circuit Court-. D. of NeNw York.
JAMES R. SMITH v. OSCAR J. AVERILL.*
Property was seized by a collector of internal revenue for 'an alleged viola
tion of internal revenue laws, was libelled for forfeiture in the U. S. District
Court, the causetried, verdict given for the claimant, and certificate of probable
cause granted. Claimant sued the collector to recoverthe value of the property
so seized, and never returned to him.
M , Heis entitled to recover. Certificate of probable cause is no defense in
such action, unless the collector shall have forthwithreturned the seized goods
to the claimant.
Although the marshal had returned the property that he bad attached, It is
nevertheless not his duty, but that of the collector, to see that the same is sur.
spmdered to the claimant.

CJhurch, Aiznger and Cooke, for plaintiffs.
Win. Dorsheimer, U. S. Dist. Att'y, for defendant.
We are indebted for tbis cage to the courtesy of Hon. N. K. Hall.
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HALT, D. J.-This is a suit brought against the defendant,
to recover the value of property seized by him as a Collector
of Internal Revenue, for an alleged violation of the Internal
Revenue Act.
The question of forfeiture was tried in the District Court,
upon an information founded upon such seizure, and a verdict
was found for the present plaintiff; who appeared as claimant
in that proceeding; and thereupon a certificate of probable
cause was granted by that court. The property seized was
placed in a warehouse, by the defendant's direction, soon after
the seizure, and it still remained there at the time of the
trial in this court.
The judgment of the District Court was, that the property
had not been forfeited, and that it should be discharged; but
it was conceded that it had never been returned to the claimant, the present plaintiff; who was proved to be the lawful
owner of all the property so seized.
The warehouseman, who held the property seized, testified
on the trial that he still held the same; that no one had been
there to take possession of it; that he had charges against
the defendant for holding and storing such'property; that the
U. S. Marshal had never notified him that he had taken possession of the same; and that he had no notice from any one
of such possession by the marshal.
The defendant testified that the property was taken in possession by the marshal, who showed him the order for taking
possession of it, in May, 1868, and that he had never heard of
or seen it since; but the other proofs showed that it had remained in the warehouse, where it was placed by the defendant's order, down to the time of the trial; and had never been
removed by the marshal, if he ever took, or attempted to take
formal possession of the same. On the cross-examination of
the defendant, he stated that he never saw the property after
it was seized.
The marshal's return to the warrant of arrest and monition,
stated that he had attached the propetty, and given the proper
notices; but the proof showed that he had not removed it from
the warehouse, where it was deposited by the defendant's order;
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and there was no proof that he had in any way interfered with
the possession of the property by the warehouseman, as the
bailee of the defendant. It will, however, be assumed, for the
purposes of the present cbntroversy, that the return of the
marshal is conclusive; and that either by the endorsement and
delivery to him of the warehouse receipt for the property, or
otherwise, he had properly executed his process, and afterward held the property under legal arrest, until it was discharged by the judgment of the District Court; or else that it
was so held by the collector, after the marshal's seizure, as
the legal custodian 'under the Act of Congress.
A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject t6 the opinion
of the court; and the counsel for the respective parties have
submitted the case upon their written briefs.
The important question now to be determined, is whether
the certificate of reasonable cause, granted by the District
Court, is a good defense to this action; as the property seized
wps never returned, or offered to be returned, to the owner.
In a case of municipal seizure, like that complained of in
this case, probable and reasonable cause is no defense, except
where some statute creates and defines the exception from
damages-Te Apollon, 9 Wheaton 362, 373; but in prize
cases the captors, if there be probable cause, are entitled, as of
right, to an exemption from damages: Ibid, 372, 373 :-and,
therefore, decisions made in prize cases are of no authority in
respect to the present question, which depends entirely upon
the construction of the Acts of Congress.
In this case, the exemption from damages is claimed under
the first section of the Act of the 24th of February, 1807, and
the 89th section of the Customs Act of 1799, and each of these
contains a provision that the property.seized must be returned.
The provisions of these sections, in respect to the question now
presented, are substantially the same; and that contained in
the Act of 1807, reads as follows: "That when any prosecution
shall be commenced on account of the seizure of any ship or
Vessel, goods, wares, or merchandise, made by any collector or
other officer, under any Act of Congress authorizing such
seizure, and judgment shall be given for the claimant or claim.
VoT. XVIII.--4
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ants, if it shall appear to the court before whom such prosecu.
tion shall be tried, that there was a reasonable cause of seizure, thesaid court shall cause a proper certificate or entry to be
made thereof; and in such case the claimant or claimants shall
not be entitled to costs, nor shall the person who made the
seizure, or the prosecutor, be liable to action, suit or judgment
on account of such seizure and prosecution; Providedthat the
ship or vessel, goods, wares, or merchandise, be, after judgment,
forthwith returned to such claimant or claimants, his, her, or
their agent or agents."

It was insisted by the plaintiff's counsel that, under this
section and proviso, the certificate of reasonable cause was no
defense, because the property had not been returned; and he
cited in support of his position the case of Hrit v. Hook, 14
Mass. Rep. 210, decided in the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, by Chief Justice PARKER,
THATCHER, PUTNAM, and WILD,in 1817.

and Justices

The property in controvrsey in that case had been seized
and libelled, and then sold, pendente lite, under the order of the
U. S. District Court. After it had been sold the cause was
tried, and Hoit, the plaintiff, as the then claimant, had a verdict. The district judge thereupon decreed that the property
was not liable to forfeiture; that there was reasonable cause
for the seizure; that $384.83 for the expense which had been
incurred by the custody and sustenance of the cattle seized,
should be deducted from the proceeds of sale; and that the
residue, $151.57. should be paid to the claimant.
A verdict having been taken for the plaintiff in the State
court, subject to the opinion of that court, upon the facts stated,
the question whether the certificate and decree of the District
Court were a defense was argued, and the court decided that
certificate of reasonable cause could operate as a bar to an
action only when the property was restored, according to the
proviso in the statute above referred to, and ordered judgment
for the plaintiff on the verdict.
This case seems to be directly in point; and it was decided
by judges of the highest character for learning and ability. It
was, however, insisted by the attorney for the United States,
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who appeared for the defendant, that he should not be hold
responsible, by reason of the men-return of the property seized,
for the following reasons, viz: "First. The plaintiff has never
made.a demand upon the collector for the return of the property.
Second. The collector did not have the possession of the property after the filing of the information; the marshal took
nossession under the process of the court. The collector had
no longer any control of the property and was not liable therefor."' And he cited Burke v. Trevitt, 1 Mas. 96; The Maria,4
Robinson 848; Shattuck v. A-atey, 1 Wash. C. C. Rep. 245. He
also insisted that " the plaintiff failing to obtain possession of
his property, should have applied to the Distrii Court, which
has power to compel a re-delivery of the property, or its
value, into the possession of those who may be entitled to it."
And to maintain this position he cited Slocum v. Aayborry, 2
Wheaton 1; Gelston v. Hoyt, 2 Wheaton 247; and Burke v.
Trevitt, ubi supra.

The cases cited do not sustain these positions, or weaken the
authority of the case of Hoit v. Hook. In the case of Burke v.
Trvitt,there had been no information filed against the property
in respect to which a recovery was claimed; and, of course,
there was no certificate of probable cause. The owner of the
property failed to recover, because he failed to make out the
trespass or taking alleged.
The case of The M'aria was a case of capture as an alleged
prize-ure belli-and, as has been before stated, such cases
have no application to the present question. In the cases of
Shattuck v. Mkaey, and Slocum v. Mayberry, there had been no

trial, or certificate of reasonable cause; and in Gelson v. Hoyt,
there had been a trial, but a certificate of reasonable cause had
been refused by the District Court. In short, these authorities are not applicable to the present case.
It was, however, insisted that the property having been
arrested by the marshal, under the warrant of arrest, it was no
longer in the custody of the defendant; that it was the duty of
the marshal to return the property; that if he failed to do so,
the plaintiff should have applied to the District Court to
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compel the marshal to return the property; and that the
defendant was not liable for the marshal's default.
It is quite certain that it was not the duty of the marshal
to make return of the property to the clainant; and that the
District Court could only require him to release the property
from the arrest. But if it were the duty of the marshal to
make the return, and the court had power to require him to
perform such duty, it would nevertheless be very doubtful, to
say the least, whether the marshal's neglect of duty would not
prevent the statute from operating as a protedtion to the
defendant. The return of the property forthwith after judgment, is a condition precedent to the exemption from liability
declared by the statute; and it is clear that it was the intention
of Congress that a failure to make such return, should fix the
liability of the seizing officer. If the marshal neglected his
duty, to the injury of the seizing officer, the latter must seek
his remedy against the marshal; and if any application to the
District Court was necessary to secure such return, it was the
defendant's duty, and not that of the plaintiff to take care
that such application was made, in order to secure the protection of the statute.
But the marshal had no such duty imposed upon him in this
case; and the defendant was liable to the warehouseman for
storage, for which the latter could probably retair the possession of the property-at least as against the defendant-and
perhaps as against the plaintiff; and against the marshal after
the order or judgment of the District Court that the property
should be discharged, and that there was reasonable cause for
4
the seizure.
The plaintiff must have judgment upon the verdict.

